I. INTRODUCTION
Political economists' understanding of property rights and the rules used to create and enforce property rights shape perceptions of resource degradation problems and the prescriptions recommended to solve such problems. Ambiguous terms blur analytical and prescriptive clarity. The term "common-property resource" is a glaring example of a term that is repeatedly used by political economists to refer to varying empirical situations including: (1) property owned by a government, (2) property owned by no one, and (3) property owned and defended by a community of resource users.1 The term is also used to refer to any common-pool resource used by multiple individuals regardless of the type of property rights involved. The purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights that may be held by the users of a resource system. We define a property-rights schema ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We do not find that "owners" are the only resource users who make long-term investments in the improvement of resource systems. Proprietors face incentives that are frequently substantial enough to encourage similar long-term investments. Even claimants may manage use patterns to an extent not predicted by a simpler property-rights dichotomy. We apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of empirical settings but focus in particular on the Maine lobster industry.
Ostrom 1982).2 Operational activities are constrained and made predictable by operational-level rules regardless of the source of these rules. By the term "rules" we refer to generally agreed-upon and enforced prescriptions that require, forbid, or permit specific actions for more than a single individual (E. Ostrom 1986).3 Examples of operational rules are those used by fishers to specify the types of fishing equipment authorized or forbidden at particular locations within a fishing ground.
Operational rules are changed by collective-choice actions. Such actions are undertaken within a set of collective-choice rules that specify who may participate in changing operational rules and the level of agreement required for their change. Changing the types of fishing equipment authorized or forbidden at different locations within a resource is an example of a collective-choice action. The particular set of operational rules that are actually in use and enforced may have been devised in multiple arenas. Operational rules related to inshore fisheries are as apt to be devised in a local meeting place, even a tavern, as they are in a court, a legislature, or a governmental bureau.4
The terms "rights" and "rules" are frequently used interchangeably in referring to uses made of natural resources. Clarity in analysis is enhanced by recognizing that "rights" are the product of "rules" and thus not equivalent to rules. "Rights" refer to particular actions that are authorized (V. Ostrom 1976). "Rules" refer to the prescriptions that create authorizations. A property right is the authority to undertake particular actions related to a specific domain (Commons 1968) . For every right an individual holds, rules exist that authorize or require particular actions in exercising that property right. In this paper we focus entirely on rights, but we need to stress from the beginning that all rights have complementary duties. To possess a right implies that someone else has a commensurate duty to observe this right (ibid.). Thus rules specify both rights and duties.
In regard to common-pool resources, the most relevant operational-level property rights are "access" and "withdrawal" rights. These are defined as:
Access:
The right to enter a defined physical property. Withdrawal: The right to obtain the "products" of a resource (e.g., catch fish, appropriate water, etc.).5 If a group of fishers hold rights of access, they have the authority to enter a resource. Rules specify the requirements the fishers must meet in order to exercise this right. For instance, fishers may be required to reside in a specified jurisdiction and to purchase a license before entering a fishing ground. In addition, fishers, through a lottery, may be assigned particular fishing spots (Faris 1972; Martin 1973). The assignment of fishing spots is an operational-level 2A third level of action is also available and that is the constitutional level. Constitutional-choice actions entail devising collective-choice rules. In establishing an organization or changing the process by which operational rules are to be devised within an existing organization, individuals engage in constitutionalchoice actions. Fishers creating a marketing cooperative is an example of a constitutional-choice action.
3A plan adopted by an individual for how that individual wishes to undertake future actions is better thought of as a "strategy" rather than as a "rule." The concept of "rule" relates to shared understandings about prescriptions that apply to more than a single individual. A marriage contract can be viewed as a set of rules authorizing and forbidding future actions for the two individuals involved. A court decision outlawing some types of agreements among fishers using inshore fisheries is a set of rules affecting future actions for all individuals using the coastal fisheries under that court's jurisdiction. Rules, be they operational, collective choice, or constitutional choice, instruct individuals to take actions that are required or permitted, or to avoid taking action that is forbidden (Gardner and Ostrom 1991; E. Ostrom 1986; see Buck [1989] for an analysis of the rules creating property rights in the American southwest). 4Not all actions taken in collective-choice arenas affect rules in use. Passing a new law or writing a new regulation is not the equivalent of establishing a new rule. Laws and regulations must be enforced to become rules (see V. Ostrom 1991). To be effective they must be accepted as legitimate by resource users. 5Rules defining the rights of access and withdrawal may or may not permit those rights to be transferred. The right to determine who will have an access right, and how that right may be transferred.
Alienation:
The right to sell or lease either or both of the above collectivechoice rights.
The right of management is a collectivechoice right authorizing its holders to devise operational-level withdrawal rights governing the use of a resource. Individuals who hold rights of management have the authority to determine how, when, and where harvesting from a resource may occur, and whether and how the structure of a resource may be changed. For instance, a group of fishers who devise a zoning plan that limits various types of harvesting activities to distinct areas of a fishing ground are exercising rights of management for their resource (see, e.g., Davis 1984; Cordell 1972).
The right of exclusion is a collectivechoice right authorizing its holders to devise operational-level rights of access. Individuals who hold rights of exclusion have the authority to define the qualifications that individuals must meet in order to access a resource. For instance, fishers who limit access to their fishing grounds lo males above a certain age who live in a particular community and who utilize particular types of gear are exercising a right of exclusion.7
The right of alienation is a collectivechoice right permitting its holder to transfer part or all of the collective-choice rights to another individual or group. Exercising a right of alienation means that an individual sells or leases the rights of management, exclusion, or both.8 Having alienated those rights, the former rights-holder can no longer exercise these authorities in relation to a resource or a part thereof.
Arraying these rights, as shown in Table   6See Copes ( 8By alienation we specifically mean the authority to sell or lease collective-choice rights. We do not include the ability to bequeath. In most commonproperty regimes, users have the ability to bequeath their rights in a resource. Rights rarely die with an individual. In many situations, however, resource users do not have the right to sell or lease their rights to others. Limiting alienation to sale or lease also brings it closer to its economic usage. The importance of a right of alienation for many economists is that it provides the possibility that resources will be transferred to their highest valued use. While being able to sell or lease collective-choice rights provides that potential, the right to bequeath these rights is usually presumed by economists to be an insufficient property right to achieve full efficiency. Larson and Bromley (1990) effectively challenge this commonly held view and argue that much more needs to be known about the specific values of a large number of parameters in a particular setting before analysts can make careful judgments whether the right of alienation leads to higher levels of efficiency than the right to bequeath. See also Anderson and Hill (1990) for an analysis of three different alienation rules that the U.S. government used in transferring public lands to individuals.
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Land Economics On the other hand, to hold some of these rights implies the possession of others. The exercise of withdrawal rights is not meaningful without the right of access; alienation rights depend upon having rights to be transferred. We call individuals holding operationallevel rights of access and withdrawal "authorized users."'0 If specified in operational rules, access and withdrawal rights can be transferred to others either temporarily, as in a lease arrangement, or permanently when these rights are assigned or sold to others. Transfer of these rights, however, is not equivalent to alienation of management and exclusion rights as we discuss below.
The rights of authorized users are defined by others who hold collective-choice rights of management and exclusion. Authorized users lack the authority to devise their own harvesting rules or to exclude others from gaining access to fishing grounds. Even though authorized users may be able to sell their harvesting rights, nevertheless, they lack the authority to participate in collective action to change operational rules.
An example of authorized users are the salmon and herring fishers of Alaska. In 1972, the Governor's Study Group on Limited Entry was created to research and develop limited entry legislation, which the Alaskan legislature adopted in 1973 (Adasiak 1978, 771). The Alaskan limited entry system divides Alaskan salmon and herring fisheries into a number of different fisheries. An Entry Commission determines the number of permits available for each fishery. The Commission can make adjustments in the numbers as circumstances change, either by issuing additional permits or by buying back existing permits. Fishers cannot hold more than one permit per fishery. The permits are freely transferable, but cannot be used as collateral. The Alaskan fishers who hold permits are authorized users. The Alaskan legislature in conjunction with a study group devised the fishers' rights of access and withdrawal, which 9While theoretically it is possible to hold entry rights without withdrawal rights, in practice this rarely occurs. The distinction between access and withdrawal becomes crucial at a collective-choice level. Oftentimes individuals who hold rights of management and thereby define withdrawal rights are not the same individuals who hold rights of exclusion and thereby define access rights. We provide a number of examples throughout the remainder of the paper.
10One could also define a position called "squatter" to consist of individuals who possess no rights at any level in relation to a common-pool resource. Squatters use natural resources, such as fisheries, but they do so at their own risk. If challenged by a person who holds collective-choice or operational rights, squatters lack authority to enforce their claims. Squatters stand entirely exposed to the actions of others as concerns the use of a resource.
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August 1992 fishers can transfer. The fishers do not directly participate in making collective choices and thus cannot devise their own operational-level rules concerning the use of their fisheries. We define as "claimants" individuals who possess the same rights as authorized users plus the collective-choice right of management." With the right of management, claimants have the collective-choice authority to devise operational-level rights of withdrawal. They cannot, however, specify who may or may not have access to resources, nor can they alienate their right of management. For instance, the net fishers of Jambudwip, India, are claimants (Raychaudhuri 1972) . Jambudwip is an island in the Bay of Bengal which is only occupied during fishing seasons when fishers establish camps and fish off its southwestern shore. The Jambudwip fishers, exercising management rights, have devised a set of withdrawal rules that permit them to coordinate their use of the fishing grounds. At the beginning of a fishing season each crew chooses a spot on which to set their net. A large bag net is suspended between two posts which are then driven into the ocean floor. Rules, as well as environmental conditions, govern the placing of nets. As Raychaudhuri explains:
According to the convention of the fisherfolk, one is not allowed to set his net in a line, either in front or behind another's net. But there is no bar to set on any side of it .... If one net is set in front of another, both lose the catch, either of the tide or of the ebb. (Raychaudhuri 1972, 174) In addition, a spot once claimed by a fishing crew belongs to that crew for the remainder of the fishing season. Even if the crew removes its net from the spot and moves to another spot, no other crew can fish the abandoned spot unless first gaining permission from the original crew (ibid., 167-68). While the Jambudwip fishers have exercised management rights by devising rules that define withdrawal rights, they do not exercise the authority to decide who can that they utilize. Consequently, the Jambudwip fishers are claimants and not "proprietors."
" The fishers who participate in the cod trap fisheries of Newfoundland are proprietors. Cod trap berths are allocated by lottery. To gain access to a berth, a fisher must participate in a lottery. "Only fishermen from the local community are allowed to participate in the lottery" and to sit on the local cod trap berth committee that operates the lottery (Martin 1979, 282). The lottery system is significant in that "the organization of cod trap committees since 1919 has legally codified the boundaries of the fishing space over which a community has political jurisdiction" (Martin 1973, 15).
Turkish fishers who harvest from coastal lagoons are also proprietors. The Turkish government leases lagoons to fishers' cooperatives. For instance, it leases the Ayvalik-Haylazli lagoon to a fishers' co-op of the same name. To access and harvest fish from the lagoon, a fisher must belong to the co-op. In order to belong to the co-op a fisher must reside in one of the three adjacent villages for at least six months and not In many instances government officials simply pay little attention to inshore fisheries, leaving fishers with sufficient autonomy to design workable arrangements. For many years this was the case for fishers of Valenca, Brazil, who fished from the adjacent estuary (Cordell 1972 ). These fishers held de jure rights of access and withdrawal when they first developed the fishery at the beginning of this century. Initially, they experienced a number of problems due to the diverse technologies in use. Gear became entangled and was destroyed, leading to violence among the fishers. In addition, fishers fought over the choicest fishing spots (ibid., 105). Over a period of time fishers designed harvesting arrangements that addressed many of the problems they had experienced. The fishers divided the estuary among different technologies so that diverse gears were not utilized within the same area (ibid., 42). In addition, fishers allocated fishing spots by drawing lots to determine the order of use of a particular spot. The Valenca fishers did not initially experience exclusion problems. No other fishers exhibited interest in fishing the estuary. While the Valenca fishers were de jure authorized users, they were de facto claimants.
The Brazilian government, in an attempt to "modernize" fisheries, made nylon nets available to anyone who qualified for a bank loan arranged by the government through the Banco do Brasil. The Valenca fishers did not qualify for bank loans and could not purchase nets. A number of wealthy individuals around Valenca did qualify, and purchased nets. These individuals hired men to fish with the nets, men who had no prior fishing experience. The men invaded the Valenca estuary. Conflict erupted between the established fishers and the new entrants. Fishers were shot and equipment destroyed. The de facto property rights crumbled as fishers fought for whatever fishing spots they could gain. The fishery was overharvested and eventually was abandoned (Cordell 1978) . 4 De facto property systems are important for several reasons. First, the resource economics literature examining property rights and fishery regulation is generally pessimistic about the likelihood of fishers undertaking self-regulation so as to avoid inefficient economic outcomes, such as rent dissipation and the extinction of valuable species. Third, since the professional literature is so pessimistic about fishers adopting effective self-regulation, this literature is used by policy analysts to recommend sweeping reforms. These reforms, however, may "sweep away" successful human efforts to solve extremely difficult problems (see, e.g., Berkes 1989; Davis 1984). Fourth, since the regulation of these de facto proprietor regimes is undertaken by local fishers who benefit from these regimes, the costs of regulation are largely borne by these same beneficiaries. Institutional arrangements that internalize the costs of monitoring and exclusion among beneficiaries reduce inefficiencies.
IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS, INCENTIVES, AND OUTCOMES
Different bundles of property rights, whether they are de facto or de jure, affect the incentives individuals face, the types of actions they take, and the outcomes they achieve. An important difference often discussed in economics is that between owners, who hold a complete set of rights, and all other users who do not hold complete rights. In particular, the right of alienation is believed crucial for the efficient use of resources.15 Alienation rights, combined with rights of exclusion, produce incentives for owners to undertake long-term investments in a resource. Through the sale or lease of all or part of the property rights owners hold, they can capture the benefits produced by long-term investments. In addition, alienation permits a resource to be shifted from a less productive to a more productive use (Posner 1975 Owners of natural resources often invest in the physical structure of resources that maintain or increase the productivity of the resource. For instance, the fishers of Ascension Bay, discussed earlier, place artificial habitats, called casitas, on the sea floor in each of their campos, which attract lobsters (Miller 1989) . Lobsters are attracted because they "are gregarious; because they remain in dens during the day; and because they do not modify existing habitat or build new habitat" (ibid., 190). In addition, casitas may enhance the productivity of the campos because they provide "refuge sites from predators," and those located near feeding grounds of lobsters "have the potential to reduce predation risk" (ibid.). Fishers of Ascension Bay regularly make long-term investments in their fishing grounds.
Rights of alienation, however, are not the only important distinction among rights-holders. Another important difference is that between claimants and authorized users on the one hand, and proprietors and owners on the other hand, based on the right of exclusion. The right of exclusion produces strong incentives for owners and proprietors to make current investments in resources. Because proprietors and owners can decide who can and cannot enter a resource, they can capture for themselves and for their offspring the benefits from investments they undertake in a re-'5 By efficiency, we focus in this article on the level of resource rents that are obtained by fishers and not dissipated through overinvestment or other inefficient practices. Copes (1972) points out that in relation to fisheries, however, not only can resource rent be dissipated but producer and consumer surplus can be lost, depending upon the institutional arrangements that govern the use of a fishery. We have not attempted to expand our analysis of efficiency to that of total social surplus, as we are not examining property rights to resource units in commodity markets.
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August 1992 source.16 Owners and proprietors are reasonably assured of being rewarded for incurring the costs of investment (Posner 1975) . Such investments are likely to take the form of devising withdrawal rights that coordinate the harvesting activities of groups of owners or proprietors so as to avoid or resolve common-pool resource dilemmas. In addition, owners and proprietors devise access rights that allow them to capture the benefits produced by the withdrawal rights (Dahlman 1980). Claimants, because of their rights of management, face stronger incentives than do authorized users to invest in governance structures for their resources even though their incentives are weaker than proprietors or owners. Claimants can devise operational-level rights of withdrawal for their situation. Without collective-choice rights of exclusion, however, they can no longer be assured of being rewarded for investing in withdrawal rights. Consequently, whether claimants exercise their rights of management depends upon whether they act within a set of circumstances that allows them to capture the benefits of coordinating their activities even without rights of exclusion.
For instance, claimants may utilize resources that no other groups are interested in using, or claimants may be physically isolated from other populations so that exclusion is not problematic. In such situations, claimants are likely to be able to capture the benefits from exercising their rights of management. The fishers of Valenca, Brazil, discussed earlier, even though claimants, utilized fishing grounds of no interest to other potential users. Over a period of time the fishers devised a number of withdrawal rights that resolved the common-pool resource dilemmas that they faced. For several decades the Valenca fishers enjoyed the benefits produced from coordinating their use of the Valenca estuary. Of course, such arrangements are vulnerable to external invasion as the Valenca fishery attests.
Finally, authorized users possess no authority to devise their own rules of access and withdrawal. Their outcomes are dependent primarily upon the operational-level rights that others define for them. Whether the incentives they face induce them to act so as to achieve efficient outcomes depends upon the institutional design skills of those who hold the collective-choice rights. Since authorized users do not design the rules they are expected to follow, they are less likely to agree to the necessity and legitimacy of the rules. Authorized users may engage in a game with rule enforcers, seeking to gain as much as possible. This leads to an overinvestment in the fishery and inefficient outcomes.
IV. A CONSIDERATION OF THE MAINE LOBSTER FISHERY
The state of Maine has owned the lobster grounds off its coast since its founding. The most general property-rights regime is one of government ownership with de jure authorized users status extended to all who obtain licenses (Acheson 1975 ). In addition to de jure authorized user rights, lobstermen in many harbors have developed de facto proprietor rights among themselves (Acheson 1975; Grossinger 1975) . Prior to 1920, the entire coast was divided into a series of lobster "fiefs" with the men from each harbor or island fishing only the grounds associated with their own harbors. The lobstermen in each fishing village determined who could enter "their" grounds. Further, they decided how these grounds would be used-what production techniques would be allowed, etc. Since the lobstermen could not sell, lease, or bequeath their rights of management and exclusion, they would be classified as de facto proprietors.
The enforcement of the de facto proprietor rights was borne entirely by the lobstermen of each village. The sanction that (Acheson 1975, 191) . By taking this action, the legislature recognized the existence of a territory called "Monhegan waters." The State takes on the role of the traditional police officer patrolling waters to enforce proprietor property rights during six months of the year. From January 1 to June 25, the Monhegan lobstermen patrol their own territory. They choose to fish during this period because most other lobstermen do not fish during these months and the price of lobster is at its highest level.
The fact that different property-rights systems exist side-by-side along the Maine coast permits a comparative institutional analysis.'7 Wilson and Acheson collected data from three lobstergrounds whose boundaries were well defended (de facto proprietors) and from three adjoining lobstergrounds whose boundaries were permeable (de jure authorized users). Wilson and Acheson collected data on crowding effects, seasonality of catches, the age and size of the lobsters caught, stock density, and income. They found that defended grounds were not as crowded as undefended grounds. There were fewer boats per square mile in defended areas, and the average catch as measured by the number of lobsters per trap hauled was 60 percent greater in these areas (Acheson 1975, 196; Wilson 1977, 104) .
In relation to the seasonality of the two types of fisheries, the average catch remained relatively stable throughout the year in defended grounds. Lobstermen with de facto proprietor rights spread their fishing effort more evenly throughout the year. In undefended grounds, the average catch is quite high from August 1 to December 31, declining dramatically over the remaining several months (Wilson 1977, 106) . Average catches are high during this time period because lobsters molt into legal size and there is a rush to harvest such lobsters quickly. Lobstermen without de facto proprietor rights expend much of their fishing effort during five months of the year.
The relatively uncrowded conditions and the stable fishing effort that characterizes defended grounds translate into greater stock densities in those grounds than in undefended areas. Acheson reports that depending on the time of year, stock densities of defended grounds are from 22 percent to 50 percent greater than those of undefended grounds (1975, 202) .
In light of the above data, it is not surprising that the incomes of lobstermen who have de facto proprietor rights are, on average, greater than the incomes of de jure authorized users. As Wilson tentatively reports (N = 27), lobstermen from controlled areas average $22,929 per year as opposed to $16,449 for lobstermen from uncontrolled areas (Wilson 1977, 108) . The work of Acheson and Wilson suggests that de facto proprietors experience greater benefits when compared to de jure authorized users. In addition, their work reveals the importance of holding a right of exclusion. Having a right of exclusion encouraged lobstermen to invest in institutional arrangements to govern their grounds.
The major purpose of this article is to propose a property-rights scale ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner, that provides a better analytical scheme for beginning to explain outcomes achieved by joint users of a common-pool resource, particularly inshore fisheries.18 By examining the evidence concerning the institutions that govern Maine lobster fisheries and the outcomes lobstermen have achieved, we are calling attention to the importance of discriminating among a range of incentives.
VI. CONCLUSION
The development of effective propertyrights systems to manage inshore fisheries is extraordinarily difficult no matter what type of property-rights regime is adopted (Johnson and Libecap 1982; Buck 1988). Assigning full ownership rights does not guarantee an avoidance of resource degradation and overinvestment (Larson and 17It is this capacity to do comparative institutional analysis that is missed when scholars presume that any regime that is not "private property" must be the equivalent of open access (Bell 1972 None of the governmental policy interventions that are frequently recommended clearly produce net benefits in all situations either. Quota systems ignore the great differences in the fishing skills of participants and protect the inefficient (Pearse 1980; Johnson and Libecap 1982) . Taxes imposed by a larger government raise substantial questions as to how the tax will be used and whether the transfer of funds from the fishers to a government bureaucracy will enhance overall efficiency. Implementing fishery regulations is frequently fraught with unexpected problems and failures (Dewar 1990).
Instead of blind faith in private ownership, common-property institutions, or government intervention, scholars need a better understanding of: (1) the conditions that enhance or detract from the emergence of more efficient property-rights regimes related to diverse resources, (2) the stability or instability of these systems when challenged by various types of exogenous or endogenous changes, and (3) the costs of enforcing regulations that are not agreed upon by those involved. Further, the performance of property-rights regimes in field settings needs to be compared to other regimes in field settings. No real-world institution can win in a contest against idealized institutions. The valid question is how various types of institutional arrangements perform comparatively when confronted with similarly difficult environments.
